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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                     
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 In this diversity action, we must determine whether the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would consider certain conduct as 
falling within the definition of "use or maintenance of a motor 
vehicle," as defined by the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial 
Responsibility Law's ban on subrogation for certain types of 
insurance benefits, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1720.  We predict that the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would conclude that a driver who 
slips on grease from a nearby kitchen when he steps on the ground 
while alighting from a car is not engaged in use or maintenance 
of a motor vehicle.  We will therefore reverse the decision of 
the district court. 
I. 
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 The district court disposed of this case on motion for 
summary judgment.  We have jurisdiction over the appeal from the 
district court's final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Subject matter jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We 
exercise plenary review over the district court's order, both as 
an appeal from grant of summary judgment, Petruzzi's IGA 
Supermarkets v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d 
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 554 (1993), 
and because the dispute requires only an interpretation of law, 
Matter of Resyn Corp., 945 F.2d 1279, 1280 (3d Cir. 1991). 
II. 
 The parties agree on the relevant facts.  On November 
27, 1987, Robert Hilpl parked his car in the parking lot of the 
St. Johns Neumann Nursing Home.  Hilpl was employed as a bid 
manager for Perloff Brothers, Inc., and had arrived at the 
nursing home to meet with representatives of Woods Management 
Services, a company that operated the nursing home's kitchen. 
Woods Management was a prospective customer of Perloff Brothers, 
and Hilpl intended to present the Woods representatives with 
calendars, planning guides, and other business-related paperwork. 
 After parking his car and turning off the engine, Hilpl 
began to exit the vehicle.  He placed his left foot on the ground 
and started to stand up, pushing off with his right foot from 
inside the vehicle.  In the process, Hilpl slipped on a pool of 
grease or similar substance that had coated a section of the 
parking lot.  He fell, striking his back on the sill of the car 
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door.  At oral argument, the parties appeared to concede that the 
grease emanated from the nursing home's kitchen. 
 Hilpl's employer, Perloff Brothers, accepted 
responsibility for the injury, treating it as a work-related 
incident covered by the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act, 
77 P.S. §§ 1-1602.  Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("Liberty 
Mutual"), the workers' compensation carrier for Perloff, provided 
Hilpl with lost wage benefits and medical benefits.  As of June 
30, 1993, benefits totaled $285,875.82.  At the time of oral 
argument, benefits exceeded $400,000. 
 In addition to receiving benefits, Hilpl brought a 
third party action in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, 
seeking damages for the injuries he sustained in the accident. 
Hilpl sued Woods Management, Neumann Nursing Home, and the 
nursing home's parent organization, the Archdiocese of 
Philadelphia.  Pursuant to 77 P.S. § 319, Liberty Mutual acquired 
a subrogation lien on the proceeds of this action by operation of 
law. 
 On June 30, 1993, the Common Pleas action was settled 
for $800,000.  As part of the settlement, U.S. Underwriters 
Insurance Co., the insurer of the nursing home, and Maryland 
Casualty Co., the insurer of Woods Management, (hereinafter, 
collectively, "the Tort Liability Insurers") agreed to assume 
responsibility for all amounts that had accrued on Liberty 
Mutual's subrogation lien on or before the settlement date. 
 On October 1, 1993, the Tort Liability Insurers filed a 
declaratory judgment action in the U.S. District Court for the 
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Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking to invalidate the 
subrogation lien pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1720.  Section 1720 
bars a compensation insurer's right of subrogation to recover 
workers' compensation benefits from an insured's third-party tort 
recovery if the insured's injuries arose from the maintenance or 
use of a motor vehicle.  The parties filed cross motions for 
summary judgment, and on June 8, 1995, the district court entered 
judgment for plaintiffs.  Liberty Mutual appealed. 
III. 
 This controversy is easily located within the landscape 
of Pennsylvania law.  It takes place at the intersection of the 
Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act, 77 P.C.S.A. §§ 1-1602, 
and the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa.C.S.A. 
§§ 1701-1798.  Hilpl and his injury are clearly subject to the 
provisions of Workers' Compensation Act.  Section 319 of that act 
grants a workers' compensation insurer subrogation rights to an 
employee's recovery from a third party tortfeasor.  Section 1720 
of the Financial Responsibility Law limits that right, barring 
subrogation where an employee's injury arose out of the 
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.1 
                     
1
 This section provides: 
 
§ 1720.  Subrogation 
 In actions arising out of the 
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there 
shall be no right of subrogation or 
reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery 
with respect to workers' compensation 
benefits . . .. 
 
Id.; Walters v. Kamppi, 545 A.2d 975 (Pa. Commw. 1988) (applying 
plain meaning of statute to bar subrogation), appeal denied, 544 
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 The current dispute turns on the meaning of 
"maintenance or use of a motor vehicle" as defined by § 1720. The 
Tort Liability Insurers contend, and the district court agreed, 
that Hilpl's actions in exiting his car fell within the scope of 
maintenance or use.  Liberty Mutual argues otherwise, claiming 
that Hilpl's injury did not manifest the degree of causal 
connection to the vehicle required by the Pennsylvania courts. 
 The answer to this question is obviously controlled by 
state law.  We therefore begin with the relevant statute. 
Unfortunately, none of the terms in the phrase "arising out of 
the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle" are among those 
defined in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702, the list of statutory definitions 
for the Financial Responsibility Law.  The terms are also absent 
from the general definition section for the Vehicle Code.  75 
Pa.C.S.A. § 102.  There is therefore no controlling statutory 
provision for this case.2 
                                                                  
A.2d 512 (Pa. 1989).  The Pennsylvania legislature subsequently 
repealed § 1720's prohibition with respect to worker's 
compensation benefits, leaving in place its bar on subrogation 
rights for other types of compensation.  Act of July 2, 1993, § 
25(b), 1993 Pa. Laws 190-44.  Pennsylvania courts have 
interpreted this amendment as prospective only.  Fulmer v. 
Pennsylvania State Police, 647 A.2d 616 (Pa. Commw. 1994); Byard 
F. Brogan, Inc. v. W.C.A.B., 637 A.2d 689 (Pa. Commw. 1994); see 
also Carrick v. Zurich-American Ins. Group, 14 F.3d 907 (3d Cir. 
1994) (predicting prospective application). 
2
 The Tort Liability Insurers correctly point out that 
Pennsylvania's Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. 
§1921(c)(5), advises that former law on the subject may be 
considered in ascertaining the legislature's intent when the 
words of a statute are not explicit.  For our purposes, however, 
we must first look to controlling state authority, and prior 
enactments are only persuasive, not binding. 
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 Absent controlling statutory authority, we turn to the 
decisions of the highest state tribunal to answer a question of 
state law.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has not 
ruled on the terms of this provision. 
 When a state's highest court has not spoken on a 
subject, we must attempt to predict how that tribunal would rule. 
Kowalsky v. Long Beach Township, 72 F.3d 385, 387 (3d Cir. 1995). 
In making such determinations, we give due deference to the 
decisions of lower Pennsylvania courts.  Winterburg v. Transp. 
Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 1995).  The rulings of 
intermediate appellate courts must be accorded significant weight 
and should not be disregarded absent a persuasive indication that 
the highest state court would rule otherwise.  City of 
Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 994 F.2d 112, 123 (3d 
Cir. 1993); Rolick v. Collins Pine Co., 925 F.2d 661, 664 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  In the current case, existing decisions of 
Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court provide ample 
guidance for us to resolve this dispute. 
 We begin with Lucas-Raso v. American Mfrs. Ins. Co., 
657 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 1995), appeal denied, 668 A.2d 1119 (Pa. 
1995), a recent case in which the meaning of "maintenance and 
use" under the Financial Responsibility Law was squarely before 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court.  The court surveyed the relevant 
Pennsylvania case law, placing particular reliance on the 
adoption in Alvarino v. Allstate Ins. Co., 537 A.2d 18, 20 (Pa. 
Super. 1988), of an interpretation of "arising out of ownership, 
maintenance or use" announced by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
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in Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co. v. Goodville Mut. Casualty 
Co., 170 A.2d 571 (Pa. 1961).  In Manufacturers, the Supreme 
Court had held:  "Arising out of 'means causally connected with, 
not proximately caused by.'  'But for' causation, i.e., a cause 
and result relationship is enough to satisfy this [requirement]." 
Id. at 573.  Alvarino applied this definition to § 1720. 
 The Lucas-Raso court then stressed the importance of 
the causation element.  First, the causation inquiry serves the 
legislature's purpose in passing motor vehicle insurance 
legislation, namely "to compensate losses directly resulting from 
motoring accidents and to leave injuries tangential to driving to 
other systems of compensation.  Id. at 3 (citing Prudential 
Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 493 A.2d 731 (Pa. 
Super. 1985)).  Even more importantly, causation ensures that 
injuries suffered by a victim arise from the use of the motor 
vehicle itself.  Id.  In other words, "[t]here must be a link 
between the injury and the motor vehicle before compensation will 
be awarded."  Id. at 4. 
 The court next applied these principles to the facts of 
the case.  In Lucas-Raso, the plaintiff had been injured when 
walking around the back of her car to reach the driver's side. 
The plaintiff alleged that despite her physical position outside 
the vehicle, she was nevertheless an occupant of the car.  The 
court considered this claim, noting that "it is not disputed that 
'maintenance and use' is presumed if occupancy can be shown." Id.  
The Superior Court ultimately ruled that she was not an occupant.  
More importantly for the current case, the court then made clear 
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that occupancy alone would not satisfy § 1720's requirement of 
maintenance and use.  As the court explained, "Even if we agreed 
that . . . [the victim] was an occupant, she must still prove the 
existence of a causal connection between the injuries sustained 
and the maintenance and use of the motor vehicle."  657 A.2d at 
4. 
 We believe that Lucas-Raso accurately captures the 
state of Pennsylvania law on maintenance and use of a motor 
vehicle.  If nothing else, Lucas-Raso and the cases it surveys 
make clear that the crucial point for triggering § 1720's 
maintenance and use prohibition is a causal connection between 
vehicle and injury.  We therefore turn to that element. 
 In assessing whether the necessary causal nexus exists, 
we could--as the parties wish--struggle with the legal equivalent 
of angels and pinheads.  For example, the vehicle obviously was, 
in a sense, a cause of the accident:  Hilpl was alighting from 
the car when he fell; the car was a part of the stream of events 
that lead to his injury.  Viewing causation in these terms, 
however, makes it essentially all-encompassing:  If not for the 
unfortunate coincidence of a multitude of causes, Hilpl, his car, 
and a layer of grease might not have combined so painfully on 
that late November day.  This approach to causation would bring 
§1720 into play whenever an automobile was even tangentially 
related to an accident, since absent the car, the accident 
arguably might not have occurred.  This in turn would contravene 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court's repeated cautions that the 
Financial Responsibility Law was not intended to be a general 
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liability statute, but rather a system of compensation for 
"losses directly resulting from motoring accidents."  657 A.2d at 
3.  Nevertheless, so the counterargument goes, here the car was 
involved. 
 Fortunately, we can avoid this debate.  It is a matter 
of hornbook tort law that every incidental factor that arguably 
contributes to an accident is not a "but for" cause in the legal 
sense.  See Berry v. Borough of Sugar Notch, 43 A. 420 (Pa. 
1899).  Our survey of Pennsylvania cases demonstrates that the 
Commonwealth's understanding of "use of a motor vehicle" simply 
will not encompass the causal nexus at issue here.  See Smith v. 
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 572 A.2d 785, 787 (Pa. Super. 1990) 
(rejecting claim that injury from hay thrown from hayride arose 
from maintenance or use of a motor vehicle), appeal dismissed, 
601 A.2d 276 (Pa. 1991); Roach v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 
550 A.2d 1346 (Pa. Super. 1988) (rejecting claim that bus 
passenger injured in fight between two other passengers arose out 
of maintenance or use of motor vehicle); Alvarino v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 537 A.2d 18 (Pa. Super. 1988) (holding that injury to 
child bitten by dog while passenger in car did not arise from use 
of motor vehicle); Camacho v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 460 A.2d 353 
(Pa. Super. 1983) (holding that injury to driver from explosive 
thrown into his car by passenger in passing automobile did not 
arise out of maintenance or use of vehicle), aff'd, 473 A.2d 1017 
(Pa. 1984); Schweitzer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 452 A.2d 735 
(Pa. Super. 1982) (holding that injuries to woman, who was pushed 
into her automobile and beaten inside automobile by operator of 
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motorcycle, did not arise out of maintenance and use of motor 
vehicle); Erie Ins. Exchange v. Eisenhuth, 451 A.2d 1024 (Pa. 
Super. 1982) (rejecting claim that injuries to automobile 
passenger shot by police officer in pursuing vehicle arose out of 
maintenance or use of automobile); see also Pecorara v. Erie Ins. 
Exchange, 596 A.2d 237 (1991) (rejecting as absurd a literal 
interpretation of "used by any person . . . employed . . . in the 
automobile business" because such interpretation would prohibit 
"coverage for an accident . . . if [the owner] had lent his dump 
truck to a friend to haul lumber to a campsite, if that friend 
also happened to be an employee of an automobile business"); 
Ferry v. Protective Indem. Co., 38 A.2d 493 (Pa. Super. 1944) 
(refusing coverage for injury caused to pedestrian while truck 
driver was loading truck); cf. Walters v. Kamppi, 545 A.2d 975 
(Pa. Commw. 1988) (finding requirements of § 1720 met where truck 
driver was injured in automobile accident caused by slippery 
substance on highway from allegedly negligent road maintenance), 
appeal denied, 554 A.2d 513 (Pa. 1989).  We also note that the 
words "occupying, entering into, or alighting from a motor 
vehicle," which appeared in the definition of "use or 
maintenance" under the old Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle 
Insurance Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.106 (repealed), were not included 
when the legislature replaced the No-Fault Act with the Financial 
Responsibility Law.  We believe that this action shows a 
legislative intent consistent with the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court's understanding.  Hilpl's activity does not fall within the 
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meaning of § 1720, as intended by the legislature and interpreted 
by the courts. 
 In concluding that there was no causal connection 
between Hilpl's alighting and his subsequent accident, we place 
particular reliance on the Superior Court of Pennsylvania's 
discussion in Ohio Casualty Group of Ins. Cos. v. Bakaric, 513 
A.2d 462 (Pa. Super. 1986), appeal denied, 520 A.2d 1384 (Pa. 
1987).  In Bakaric, a husband injured his wife by shooting her in 
the face with a handgun.  There was evidence that the discharge 
occurred as the husband forced his wife into the driver's seat of 
their automobile and then pushed her across the seat to the 
passenger's side.  Id. at 463 n.1.  The court refused to 
interpret the incident as resulting from the use of a motor 
vehicle "since it is not clear in this instance that entering or 
loading the vehicle caused the injuries."  Id. at 465.  The court 
then explained that: 
A lay person's consideration of this factual 
situation . . . would probably produce a 
conclusion that any damages awarded [the 
couple] would not result from the use of an 
automobile by them, but from the wanton use 
of a gun.  We believe that the proper legal 
conclusion should be the same. 
Id. at 466 (quoting slip op. of trial court). 
 The sentiments expressed in Bakaric convey our view of 
the present case.  Pennsylvania law makes clear that "maintenance 
or use of a motor vehicle" requires causation.  The court must 
determine the "instrumentality used to cause the injury."  Spisak 
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 478 A.2d 891, 893 (Pa. Super. 1984). 
A layman would understand that the instrumentality used to cause 
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the injury in the case at bar was the substance on the surface of 
the parking lot.  The cause of Hilpl's injury was the fact that 
he slipped on grease, and all the clever arguments of skilled 
legal advocates cannot alter this central event.  It was "mere 
fortuity" that Hilpl was still partially in his car when he 
slipped.  Pecorara, 596 A.2d at 240.  Causation, however, 
requires more than "mere happenstance."  Roach, 550 A.2d at 1349. 
IV. 
 We therefore conclude that the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania would hold that an individual who slips on grease 
from a nearby kitchen when he steps on the ground while alighting 
from his automobile has not been injured as a result of 
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.  Consequently, § 1720 of 
the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law will 
not apply, and Liberty Mutual retains its subrogation lien.  We 
will reverse the decision of the district court. 
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SLOVITER, Chief Judge, Dissenting. 
 The issue is whether the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which had a long history 
of protecting the recovery of damages for injuries incurred by the drivers and occupants 
of automobiles, would have permitted the workers' compensation carrier in this case to be 
subrogated to the recovery received by the driver.  At the time of the accident in 
question, the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1720, explicitly barred a workers' compensation carrier from 
subrogation for benefits paid if the injuries arose "out of the maintenance or use of a 
motor vehicle."  See 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1720 (1984).  The driver in this case, 
Robert Hilpl, was injured while alighting from the vehicle when he slipped and injured 
himself by landing on the vehicle.  I believe that under these facts the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania would have held that Hilpl was engaged in the "use" of that vehicle.  
 The MVFRL replaced the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, 40 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. § 1009.101-1009.701 (repealed effective Oct. 1, 1984), which had defined 
"maintenance or use of a vehicle" as "maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle, 
including, incident to its maintenance or use as a vehicle, occupying, entering into 
alighting from it." (Emphasis added).  The MVFRL continues to use the phrase "maintenance 
or use" but does not define it.  Thus, the strongest argument for the majority's po
is that there is no longer language explicitly covering alighting from a vehicle in the 
new law's reference to the "maintenance or use" of the vehicle. 
 However, there is no legislative history to indicate that by enacting the MVFRL, 
the Pennsylvania legislature intended to exclude accidents occurring when a person exits a 
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vehicle. Moreover, Pennsylvania's Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
1921(c)(5), provides that it is appropriate to consider former law where legislative 
intent is unclear.  Significantly, Pennsylvania intermediate courts have looked to prior 
statutes and case law interpreting these statutes to determine whether an injury "arises 
out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle."  See, e.g., Alvarino v. Allstate In
Co., 537 A.2d 18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (analyzing prior statute and case law to determine 
that dog bite did not arise out of use of motor vehicle); Roach v. Port Authority of 
Allegheny County, 550 A.2d 1346 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (analyzing prior statute and case 
law to determine that injury resulting from fight on bus did not arise out of use of motor 
vehicle).   
 In a recent Pennsylvania Superior Court case, the court reaffirmed that 
"maintenance or use" of a vehicle is presumed if the injured party is an "occupant" of the 
vehicle at the time of the accident.  Lucas-Raso v. American Manufacturers Ins. Co.
A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).  I do not understand the majority to dispute that Hilpl 
was an "occupant" of his car at the time of the accident.  See Tyler v. Insurance Co. of 
N. Am., 457 A.2d 95, 97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (person alighting from vehicle still an 
occupant); Frain v. Keystone Ins. Co., 640 A.2d 1352, 1357 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (entering 
vehicle is transaction essential to its use).  It follows that Hilpl was "using" his 
vehicle when he was injured. 
   In Lucas-Raso, upon which the majority relies, the court found no "use" but that 
case is distinguishable.  When the plaintiff fell in a parking lot it was not while she 
was alighting but while she was walking around her car with the intent of entering it.  
She did not come into any contact with the vehicle in the course of her fall, and it would 
indeed stretch "maintenance or use" language to encompass "intended use."  In contrast, in 
this case Hilpl had never completely disengaged from his use of the car. 
 Hilpl described his position at the time of the accident in the following 
picturesque manner: 
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Q.  Where was your weight?  Was your weight on your feet at that point as 
you rose from the seat? 
 
A.  No.  My weight was still on -- my butt was still, like, in the car, and 
my feet went out from under me.  You know, if you could only picture 
know, you're getting out of the car and getting out of it front ways, and 
you have all of this and you're inching out and your feet go out from 
underneath of you, like that (Witness indicating), and then you come down, 
and boom. 
 
Q.  So when your back hit the rocker panel -- what you mean by the rocker 
panel, I'll call the -- 
 
A.  Where the door closes. 
 
Q.  The threshold of the door? 
 
A.  Yes. 
 
Q.  The bottom part that's parallel to the ground? 
 
A.  No, the top part. 
 
Q.  Well -- 
 
A.  Where the door closes.  Where that silver thing is. 
 
Q.  Okay.  Where the floor ends and the door part begins. 
 
A.  Yes. 
 
Q.  Okay.  Now, when you came down, did you come down on to that rocker 
panel, that silver part you just mentioned? 
 
A.  Yes.  That's solid iron.  That's only a silver plate over that. 
 
Q.  And that silver plate is still within the car; correct? 
 
A.  Oh, yes. 
 
Q.  And, so, your back hit that portion still within the car? 
 
A.  Yes. 
 
Q.  After your back hit that portion, what did your body do? 
 
A.  I slid down on the ground. 
 
App. at 194. 
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 The majority appears to base its decision that Hilpl was not "using" his car 
when he was in the process of alighting from it and injured himself on the car's rocker 
panel on the fact that the car didn't cause the injury.  While it may be true that the 
ultimate cause of Hilpl's injury was the grease left on the parking lot which he came in 
contact with, there seems to be no dispute that his injuries resulted from his physical 
contact with a portion of the car as he was exiting from it.   
 The majority concedes that under Pennsylvania law the causal connection required 
is not proximate cause; "but for" causation is sufficient.  See Alvarino, 537 A.2d at 20
21 ("but for" causation is sufficient as long as there is connection greater than mere 
happenstance between injuries sustained and insured vehicle).  That "but for" causat
evident in this case.  But for the manner in which Mr. Hilpl exited his car, and but for 
the fact that he landed on the rocker panel of his car, this accident would not have 
happened.  Thus, Mr. Hilpl's accident and injuries were directly related to his use of the 
car.  It is not helpful to speculate whether a different accident might have happened had 
he slipped on a slippery substance elsewhere in the parking lot.   Thus, I believe 
Pennsylvania courts would hold that Hilpl was vehicle oriented, because he was still 
partially in the car, the keys remained in the ignition and he was "inching out."    
 I would therefore affirm the decision of the district court. 
 
